

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ENTHUSIASTS

IR101 NOTEBOOK

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STUDENTS' INITIATIVE



In the memory of our professor Ilias Kouskouvelis

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1. International Relations Introduction

1.1 Basics

The term International relations (IR) was adopted when the nation identified with the state. In reality, it analyses the relations between states. Now, however, it can also involve the relations between International Organizations and their relations with states. Therefore, it includes both high politics and low politics. It is broader than the term International politics, which concerns relations of power, i.e. political relations.

The science of IR is an evolution of Political Science and not of Law. Also, it is not relevant to International Law. The science of IR observes international phenomena and seeks to draw conclusions and, if possible, to discover the "natural" laws which govern them. It is concerned with the "why" question and not the "must" one.

The science of IR was methodologically and professionally organised after World War II. It was then that schools of thought started appearing along with the development of its literature and the introduction of IR in the syllabuses of universities.

1.2 The science

The term "science" derives from the Latin "scientia", meaning knowledge. The greek word for science, "επιστήμη", deriving from the verb "επίσταμαι" signifies a deep comprehension of something. Science denotes systematic, disciplined and objective observation of phenomena. Scientific truth can be checked empirically using careful observation and measurement with experiments.

In the strict sense of the term science, IR cannot be characterized as such because it lacks the tool of experiments for apparent reasons. Nevertheless, it is a quasi-science since in IR, there are "laws" that rule the international political phenomenon, and they can be discovered through systematic, disciplined and objective observation.

The researchers of IR are interested in power, control and authority, and their division at the international level. Of course, simple descriptions of phenomena in the relations between political entities do not constitute a science.

1.3 Prominent theorists

The first-ever scientific approach to IR was made by Thucydides, who analysed the Peloponnesian War and is considered the father of IR. He does not describe, but he analyses keeping austere methodological rules in the collection and the verification of the information he uses.

Thucydides believed in the periodicity of human behaviour. "this work has been written as a forever study and not as a temporary reading". He adopts the theory of antagonism and uneven growth of power as an analytical tool. "the root cause of the war was that the increase in the Athenians' power, forces the Lacedaemonians to fight". The next major work of international politics was that of Machiavelli, The Prince.

Books about politics that offer the bases for IR:

- Leviathan- Thomas Hobbes
- Two Treatises of Government-John Locke
- The Social Contract- Jean-Jacques Rousseau
- Capital- Karl Marx
- On Liberty- John Stuart Mill

Scientific books of IR War Theory

- Carl von Clausewitz
- Alfred Mahan
- Halford Mackinder

Scientific books of IR

- Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism - Vladimir Lenin
- The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 H. Car
- Peace & War Raymond Aron
- International theory- Martin Wight
- Politics Among Nations- Hans Morgenthau
- The Anarchical Society Hedley Bull
- Man, state and war Kenneth Waltz
- Theory of international relations - Kenneth Waltz
- Power and interdependence Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye
- War and change in world politics Robert Gilpin

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2. Key Concepts of International Relations

2.1 International system

The international system can be defined as the single mechanism or field of forces that states constitute together by their interaction with one another. The action of states creates a network of dimensions which in turn form systems. Therefore, systems are not created voluntarily but come from individual efforts of the states. The international system refers to a group of units whose interactions are significant enough to justify seeing them in some sense as a coherent set.

A group of states forms an international system when the behaviour of each state is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others. The international system can also be defined as the set of political entities that maintain regular relations between them and can be involved in a general war.

For a system to exist, two conditions have to be met: A) there must be enough interconnections between the system units so that changes in one part of the system cause changes in other regions. B) The overall behaviour of the system as a whole has to differ from the expectations of its individual units. Due to the above mentioned, the international system imposes restrictions on the states that make it up, affects their behaviour and shapes their destiny.

The nature of such a system is determined by three factors: 1) the ordering principles, 2) the character of the units, and 3) the distribution of capabilities. The current international system: 1) is anarchic, 2) has states as its fundamental units because their interactions determine the context inside of which all the other units have to operate, and 3) is shaped by the power distribution between the states that make it up.

2.2 Nation-state

The nation-state model implies that its population constitutes a nation, united by many forms of shared culture such as common descent, a common language, and a common way of life. The idea of a nation-state was and is associated with the rise of the modern system of states, often called the “Westphalian system” in reference to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The balance of power that characterized that system depended on its effectiveness upon clearly defined, centrally controlled, independent entities that recognized each other’s sovereignty and territory.

The first nation-state is considered to be France, whose kings managed to gradually take away feudal lords’ power and consolidate their authority. They also persecuted various groups within the state that differed in terms of their nationality and religion. Similarly, most of the Western European nation-states were established. In the 19th-century, the will for a district sovereign was to droved various collectivities to either sick independence or unite with kin groups to create a nation-state.

Contrary to what happened in the 17th-century in Western Europe-where states created nationsthes already existing nations established their own states. International law provides that nation-states are all equal and have complete sovereignty over their territory, while none has the legal right to interfere in another state’s domestic affairs.

The nation-state in historical terms is a relatively recent arrival; its success has been due to a peculiar set of historical circumstances, and there is no guarantee that these conditions will continue into the future. In fact, in the biggest part of human history, the international system was composed of other social structures such as city-states, empires, and feudal states. Today, some nations lack their own independent state (the Kurds, for example) and states comprised of more than one nation.

2.3 International anarchy

International anarchy is a key concept in international relations theory. In international relations, anarchy signifies the absence of a global regulator. In other words, anarchy means that there is no recognized central/ higher/ superior authority above states. Therefore, the anarchic state of the international system translates to the lack of a worldwide government or a government of governments.

As a result, there is no hierarchically superior authority 1) able or entitled to regulate the relations developed among various existent collective entities in the international system; 2) empowered with the legitimate use of force; 3) that can provide justice and binding laws and be able to enforce them; 4) that can guarantee limits on the behaviour of states.

The other side, and at the same time the result of international anarchy, is state sovereignty. That is because the non-existence of a supreme authority automatically decentralizes authority to the individual states. In other words, precisely due to the anarchic state of the system, states are free to be in charge of themselves-sovereign. Hence, instead of regulatory authority on top of states, we have a horizontal relation between nominally equal entities (sovereign states) that do not have equal power, that is, capabilities.

However, to say that the international system is anarchic does not necessarily mean that it lacks order, even though no official institution can enforce it, or that international relations are in a state of chaos. In fact, the international system is prevented from being in complete disorder due to the relations of power that unfold between states.

2.4 Sovereignty

In international relations, sovereignty is an essential attribute of an entity in order to be recognized as a sovereign state in the international community, since to achieve statehood, it is necessary to possess territory, people and to be able to exercise authority over them. However, those criteria are not enough to achieve statehood since the recognition of fellow sovereign states is required.

State sovereignty, also known as Westphalian sovereignty, was established in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. It is enshrined under International Law and is the fundamental organizing principle of the international system. It means that, under International Law, states are equal and independent as other states are not allowed to intervene.

Nonetheless, sovereignty can have limitations placed upon it. This happens when a state under its own will joins an international organization or signs a treaty whereby it transfers part of its sovereignty to the organization or governing structure of the treaty and agrees to limitations on the

exercise of its sovereignty to enable the organization to carry out its functions and to achieve its aims.

2.5 International order

Social order is a pattern of human activity inside a given society that sustains elementary social life goals. These include 1) limitation of violence resulting in death or bodily harm, 2) the assurance that promises will be kept and agreements will be carried out 3) the stabilization of possession by rules of property. Likewise, order can exist in international society as well.

An international society exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and shared values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions. Therefore, according to Hedley Bull, international order is a pattern of activity that sustains international society's elementary or primary goals. These are: 1) the preservation of the system and society of states itself 2) the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of individual states. 3) peace 4) the three above mentioned social life goals.

2.6 International regimes

According to Stephen Krasner, "international regimes are a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge." International regimes are a part of international cooperation.

International regimes are formed to expand cooperation in the international system promote order in the international system make cooperation and coordination between states possible. Relatively to their level of institution and effectiveness, they can be divided into three categories:

Silent regimes: there are no standard rules, but one can expect that unofficial rules will be obeyed

Dead letter regimes: there are standard rules, however, without the expectation that they will be obeyed

Fully advanced regimes: there are both standard rules and the expectation that they will be kept.

International regimes assist in regulating international relations in several fields.

Security regimes: e.g. Concert of Europe, Rush-Bagot treaty, SALT treaties, Biological Weapons Convention

Environmental regimes: Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement

Economic regimes: GATT, WTO, IMF

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3. Theories of International Relations

3.1 Classical Realism

Classical Realism, being a part of the broader paradigm of political Realism, has its roots in the work of Thucydides. Classical Realism is concerned with the world as it is rather than how it is ought to be. In other words, it is an empirical paradigm. According to Classical Realism, international conflict and war exist because human nature is imperfect, and thus humans are inherently selfish. Consequently, international politics are a struggle for power because every group, like every individual, has expansive desires rooted in survival instinct and soon extend beyond it. The will to-live becomes the will-to-power.

Classical Realism is based on the following axioms: 1) states are the principal units in the international system, 2) the international system is anarchic and competitive, 3) states are rational actors that are called to survive in a context of uncertainty, 4) security ranks first among the states' interests, 5) security is ensured through the acquisition of power, 6) states resort to war to serve their interests and their political aims; thus war is a legitimate means to state's ends, 7) international law does not play any significant role and, even if it does, it just benefits the most powerful states, 8) international organizations are a tool that major powers use to serve their interests.

3.2 Neorealism

Neorealism subscribes to the principal axioms of Classical Realism. However, Neorealists further maintain that: 1) states are identical units (in regards to their functions) that exist inside an anarchic international system, 2) this system inherently creates constraints to states' actions and determines the kind of relations that they develop with each other, 3) international institutions reflect the power distribution inside the system, and thus they are a tool in the hands of the great powers, 4) the behavior of states does not derive from their internal characteristics and the political procedures that take place inside of them, but is determined by the systemic constraints.

According to Kenneth Waltz, the roots of war do not only exist in the imperfect and selfish human nature, but they can also be found in the level of state (war-prone states) and, most notably in the level of the international system (it provides the context inside of which war flourishes). Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order. Due to the uncertainty that exists in the system, states cannot be sure of their neighbors' intentions or trust other states, and thus they have to remain on standby. The determinant variable in the international system is the distribution of power.

3.3 Offensive realism

For offensive realists, security is scarce. Uncertainty about the intentions of other states combined with the anarchical nature of the international system compels states to maximize their power relative to other states and seek superiority, rather than equality, to make themselves more secure and thereby increase their odds of survival.

That leads to great powers adopting competitive, offensive, and expansionist policies whenever the benefits exceed the costs. Specifically, since intentions are never evident and a state might become more aggressive in the future, all states adopt a worst-case scenario and, therefore, increase

their power through expansion, leading to high levels of competition. There is no amount of power that a state can be content with. The ultimate goal of every big power is to become the global hegemon.

3.4 Defensive realism

Defensive realism holds that the international system provides incentives for expansion only under certain conditions. For defensive realists, security is plentiful. Major powers seek to maximize their security by preserving the existing balance of power through mostly defensive strategies. States strive to maximize relative security, not relative power.

Defensive realists maintain that the international system encourages states to pursue moderate and restrained behavior to ensure their survival and safety. These scholars contend that states should acquire an appropriate amount of power necessary for them to thrive. They should, however, not maximize their relative power in a quest to become hegemons.

The rationale is that aggression, competition, and expansion to maximize power through primacy and preponderance are unproductive because they will provoke the security dilemma and the formation of an opposing coalition that will undermine their position, and thereby thwart the state's effort to increase its security. Therefore, the theory predicts greater variation in internationally driven expansion and suggests that states ought to pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security generally. Cooperation is risky, but so is competition.

3.5 Neoclassical realism

The central tenets of Neoclassical Realism are that foreign policy is the result of international structure, domestic influences, and also complex relations between the two. Opposing the Neorealists' assumption that the pressures from the system are immediately translated into units' actions, Neoclassical Realists point out that there is no immediate transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior.

Rather, they argue that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. They suggest that there is a chain between a country's relative power in the anarchic system, the domestic-level variables that channel, mediate and redirect pressures from the system, and its foreign policy outcome.

Systemic pressures and incentives may shape the general direction of foreign policy without being strong or precise enough to determine the specific details of state behavior. That is because foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being. What systemic pressures can do, is to significantly limit the menu of foreign policy choices considered by a state's leaders at a particular time, rather than force the selection of one particular item on that menu over another.

3.6 Liberalism

According to liberalism, the international system consists of states, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and regional forms of integration. Liberalism doubts the existence of purely antagonistic relations inside the international system due to the presence of various forms of economic and political cooperation, which increase the interdependence in the system. Security can be achieved through interstate cooperation. Liberalism rejects the axiom of states' rational behavior and the abstract concept of national interest. Instead, it specifies the national interest of states as the result of inner processes.

For liberals, the state is a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture by domestic social coalitions. These social coalitions define state "preferences" in world politics at any point in time. Moreover, the notion of national interest is widened to encompass other state interests except for national security, for example, pure economic interests and wealth seeking.

Furthermore, liberals argue that each state seeks to realize distinct preferences under constraints imposed by the different interests of other states. However, they do not assume these divergent interests as uniformly zero-sum. At the same time, liberals reject the utopian notion of an automatic harmony of interest among individuals and groups in international society. Although the international system is anarchic and competitive, it shows a certain level of order due to the developed forms of international cooperation and the influence of international law on state behavior

3.7 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is the evolution of Liberalism and a useful supplement to Realism. Neoliberalism and Neorealism assume similar positions regarding the international system: 1) states are the main actors, 2) they act rationally and 3) international anarchy shapes their behavior. Neoliberalists, however, maintain that international institutions play a decisive role in enhancing cooperation and stability in the system. International institutions cannot eliminate the possibility of war because states still act in their interests. Moreover, cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict or potential conflict. Without the ghost of conflict, there is no need to cooperate.

Nevertheless, international institutions can promote greater cooperation between states by offering a platform through which greater coordination and cooperation can be executed, benefitting both parties. That is because institutions provide an arbitrary body that can provide states with information preventing other states from cheating. According to Neoliberalism, states try to ensure, above all else, absolute gains and potential longer-term gains out of an agreement.

Lastly, it is argued that hegemonic leadership in the system can sustain a pattern of order, which is desired due to the hegemon's ability to preserve stability in the system. Hegemony depends on a certain kind of asymmetrical cooperation that successful hegemons support and maintain. A hegemon's regime may contain norms and principles justified based on values extending beyond self-interest and regarded as obligatory on moral grounds by other governments. Principles, norms, rules, and procedures all contain injections about behavior. They imply obligation, even though these obligations are not enforceable through a hierarchical legal system.

3.8 Constructivism

Constructivism is a set of parallel scientific approaches that criticize the known paradigms, primarily those under the positivist tradition, because they do not sufficiently examine how the interests of the international politics' actors come into being and how these interests are linked to their identity. Constructivism sees how international relations function as socially constructed, implying that they can be subject to reconstruction. In other words, meanings are not fixed but can change over time depending on actors' common beliefs.

Constructivists suggest the comprehension of international politics in terms of shared social norms, beliefs, ideas, perceptions, expectations, and knowledge and not in terms of power and material forces, which gain significance only within the structure embodied in and define the margins of their action. Henceforth, international actors' understanding of the international system is not an independent variable since their identities and interests are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. Accordingly, their foreign policy is being influenced because a society identifies itself determines its foreign policy. For example, the security dilemma is a social structure in which states are suspicious about the intentions, which results in them arming themselves. Constructivists stress that self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy, because states gain knowledge regarding the importance of power and accept it as a basic rule of action.

3.9 Marxism

The marxist paradigm of international relations maintains that groups struggle for the distribution of resources. Within this struggle, the class that manages to control the means of production prevails and shapes the social construction in such a way so that it preserves its dominance upon them. Therefore, the state is a tool of the ruling class to maintain its dominance.

Hence, states are not the primary units because they are just the creation of the ruling classes and represent the existing relations of production. The core units are the classes that know no borders. The supreme national interest remains the security of the state and the security of the ruling class.

The international system is divided into two major parts accounted for the two existing classes, that of the capitalist class and that of the working class. The international system is inherently antagonistic in both the political and economic spheres, with the latter being the most important. However, it is not necessarily anarchic since the capitalist class has overall dominance. On the other hand, inside the socialist system, antagonism does not exist. Nonetheless, war between these two sides is inevitable.

As far as power is concerned, along with violence, they play a major role in the international system either by preserving and spreading the revolution of the working class or by expanding the capitalist spheres of influence. International law represents the result of these relations of power, and international organizations are the tools of the ruling class.

3.10 Feminist theory

This theory is based on the notion that gender-based groups have diverging interests inside a given society. Gender: several socially constructed characteristics that define what we mean when we

refer to masculinity and femininity. The theory goes that males, trying to secure their place and interests, managed to legitimize masculinity in the context of society and the state through its coupling with strength, violence, aggressiveness, and antagonism. Males created a community that glorifies the notion of security, i.e. a "war state" based on patriarchal structures that promotes war along with fear and sexism. As a result, females became demoted in society because they were not considered "useful" in war.

Males took charge of society's administration, calling upon its security, and females remained on the sidelines, not having the opportunity to influence the collective decisions. In this way, a - unjustified from a biological point of view- a division of labour was established between males and females. Finally, the argument holds that the males' gender fears that if females participate in the sectors of decision-making and violence, they will be deprived of their primary role in social status.

3.11 The Class of Civilizations

The "Clash of Civilizations" is a thesis formed by Samuel Huntington. It supports that the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of future conflict will be based on culture. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. A civilization is a cultural entity that is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.

It is defined by language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and the self-identification of people. As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. Huntington suggests that there are 9 major civilizations: Western, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Orthodox, Latin American, and African.

According to Huntington, the clash of civilizations is going to occur because 1) civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most importantly, religions; 2) the interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing resulting in civilization consciousness being intensified; 3) economic modernization weakens the nation-state as a source of identity; 4) the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced because a) the West is at the peak of its power and b) a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations; 5) cultural characteristics and differences are less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones 6) economic regionalism is increasing. Moreover, the clash of civilizations occurs at two levels.

At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle over the control of territory. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative power, struggle over the control of international institutions, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

However, Huntington does not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, or that groups within a civilization will not fight each other. He claims rather, that conflicts between groups in different

civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained, and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization. Even though many parts of Huntington's thesis have been criticized, for example, his categorization of certain countries, it contributes to the understanding of international relations by reminding the role that culture and cultural differences play in the international system.

3.12 Martin Wight's traditions:

Martin Wight has categorized international politics into three traditions: Machiavellian, Grotian, and Kantian.

3.12.1 Realism/Machiavellian:

- 1) Human nature is evil.
- 2) The international system is anarchic.
- 3) As a result of these two, war is inevitable
- 4) There is no international community; international relations are equal to the state of nature.

In other words, it is a war arena.

- 5) Power is self-justifying, and politics are conducted just for the sake of politics.
- 6) Politics is the source of ethics and justice. Morality is restricted to interpersonal relations. Thus foreign policy is the field of immorality.
- 7) "Rebus sic stantibus": international treaties ought to be respected as long as the circumstances that led to them have not changed.

3.12.2 Rationalism/ Grotian

- 1) Humans are not only bloodthirsty creatures, but they are also reasonable.
- 2) Even though the international system is anarchic, there is also an institutionalized international community.
- 3) Peace is the rule and war the exception, a necessary evil to be minimized. It must be just and declared of a competent authority.
- 4) Power is not an end in itself, but it has to be justified by a principle, in which case it transforms into authority.
- 5) There is an underlying law of nations that exists before them, although it's often violated.
- 6) "Pacta sunt servanda": international treaties and obligations resulting from international law must always be respected.

3.12.3 Revolutionism/Kantian

- 1) They are optimistic and perfectionists regarding human nature, which they believe can be

reshaped.

- 2) They pursue the creation of a society of states based on specific values.
- 3) War is just a means, but it is necessary to establish future peace based on a new homogenous international state of affairs.
- 4) Humanity is divided into good and evil; that is why war is also sacred.
- 5) Politics are conducted for the sake of the dogma
- 6) “Cum haereticis fides non servanda”: you do not owe to respect the treaties agreed upon with “heretics” or states with different dogma.

3.13 Regional security complex theory

The Regional security complex theory (RSCT) suggests that substantial parts of the securitisation and desecuritisation processes in the international system manifest themselves in regional clusters.

RSCT implies that if one listed all the world's security concerns, drew a map connecting each actor with its threats and with the other actors positively and negatively involved in handling them, the resulting picture would show varying degrees of intensity. Some clusters of nodes would be intensely connected, while other zones would be crossed by only few lines. Of the groups that formed, RSCT predicts that most would be territorially based.

A Regional security complex is a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.

3.14 English school of IR

Introduction

The English School theory provides the basis for the study of international and world history in terms of the social structures of international orders. Unlike many theories that claim a certain sector of the subject of International Relations, the English school provides a holistic approach to the subject, attempting to see the world as a whole. Two core elements define the distinctiveness of the English school: its A) three key concepts and its B) theoretically pluralist approach. A) It is built around establishing distinctions between three key concepts: international system, international society and world society. B) Its primary focus has centred on a synthesis of realism and rationalism.

The English School can be summed up as a variety of theoretical inquiries which conceive of international relations as a world not merely of power or prudence or wealth or capability or domination but also one of recognition, association, membership, equality, equity, legitimate interests, rights, reciprocity, customs and conventions, agreements and disagreements, disputes, offences, injuries, damages, reparations, and the rest. Prominent Theorists: Herbert Butterfield Barry Buzan Martin Wight Adam Watson Richard Little Ole Waever

3.14.1 International society

International society is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states. It puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules, and institutions at the centre of international relations theory. An international society exists when a group of like-minded states conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules and norms in their relations with one another and participate in the working of common institutions.

In other words, an international society is a group of independent political communities which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.

3.14.2 World society

The concept of World Society is crucial for the English school framework. However, it is the most problematic feature, and there are many diverging definitions and ways of seeing this concept. World society subscribes to the Kantian /revolutionist tradition, which is mostly about forms of universalist cosmopolitanism. It is aimed at socially constructed non-state systems. Hence, it takes individuals, non-state organisations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements.

World society is associated with a political system where political activity is principally focused upon individuals rather than institutionalised collectivities (states are not the predominant actors, although this does not mean they disappear) and where normative progress is understood in universal terms. World society is not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built. The concept stands to the totality of global social interaction

3.14.3 Adam Watson's spectrum of relations

In states systems, there is an inevitable tension between the desire for order and the desire for independence. Order promotes peace and prosperity. As a result, the desire for order makes constraints and voluntary commitments acceptable.

However, there is a price since order constrains the freedom of action of communities and, in particular, their rulers. In so far as the order is imposed by a hegemonic authority's actual or potential force, it can be felt as oppressive. This is especially the case with imperial and other authorities which intervene in the domestic policies of members.

The desire for autonomy, and then for independence, is the desire of states to loosen the constraints and commitments imposed upon them. But independence also has its price, in economic and military insecurity. In order to classify the level at which different communities have opted for greater freedom or order, Watson introduced a spectrum between absolute independence and absolute empire.

The two marginal positions are theoretical absolutes that do not occur in practice. For comparison purposes, he divided the spectrum into four broad categories of relationship: independence, hegemony, dominion, and empire. In order to classify the level at which different communities have opted for greater freedom or order in their relations inside a states system, Watson introduced a spectrum of four broad categories of relationships: independence, hegemony, dominion and empire.

Independence: this term states system indicates political entities that retain the ultimate ability to take external decisions as well as domestic ones.

Hegemony: when some power or authority in a system is able to ‘lay down the law’ about the operation of the system, that is to determine to some extent the external relations between member states while leaving them domestically independent

Dominion: covers situations where an imperial authority to some extent determines the internal government of other communities, but they nevertheless retain their identity as separate states and some control over their own affairs.

Empire: no more absolute in practice than independence, meaning direct administration of different communities from an imperial centre.

Keep in mind that the relation of the various communities to each other shifts constantly along the spectrum over time. Systems tighten or loosen, and hegemonic or imperial powers replace one another. There is also a variation in space. Communities involved in a system do not all stand in the same relationship to each other, or to an imperial power.

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4. Thucydides' theory of decision-making

4.1 Introduction

Through his observation, Thucydides was the first who tried to record and interpret decisions based on actual data. Moreover, he is the first in the human history of knowledge that systematically answers the four primary scientific questions: who, why, how and when. In the work of Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Ilias Kouskouvelis detects a theory of decision-making.

We can name it a theory due to the existence of the following conditions: a) reduction, b) generalization, c) a depiction that clearly manifests repetition in the future and d) suggestion of chains based on which the decisions are taken. Therefore, this theory shows Thucydides' thoughts regarding the reasons based on which people, either individually or inside a group, make decisions.

He answers primarily to these two questions: 1) why people choose to claim and take over power (as authority, command), and why do they want to maintain it when they get it? 2) How do people, including those who exercise authority, decide, and why and how do they end up to decisions that lead them to danger.

Thucydides theory on decision-making is centred on a combination of human nature, need, authority, emotions, passions, and luck, which result in decisions. The person who makes a decision does not decide inside a vacuum but inside an environment that influences the process of deciding. For Thucydides, need and human nature are the two fundamental and more decisive factors of a decision. Contrary to human nature, need has an objective character since it is created by variables that are out of the decision-makers control. In the Peloponnesian war, there are more than a hundred cases in which Thucydides quotes to need.

Causes that generate need:

- 1) external threats
- 2) hegemony
- 3) poverty (economic factors)
- 4) war
- 5) Space
- 6) negative balance of power
- 7) the unexpected
- 8) natural phenomena
- 9) chance
- 10) lack of time

The power of need is enormous. It determines decisions so that it does not leave margins on the decision-maker to make a different choice. Because in situations of need, like this now, every calculation is futile and what one requires is to deal with the danger immediately. Need affects

decisions and history itself. Thucydides was aware of that and took into consideration in his analysis of international politics of his time the role on need. Furthermore, in his research on decision-making, he combined the, in a large part objective, determinant of need with the subjective factors.

4.2 1st dimension

1st question that Thucydides tries to clarify: Why do humans decide to claim and take over power/authority, and why do they want to maintain it when they get it. Answer -> three variables: 1) Fear 2) Honor 3) Interest Passages that provide the answer: A.3,75 and A.76.2.

The first one is the Athenians' answer to the Lacedaemonians during the negotiations before the start of the war when the latter blamed them for taking over their hegemony. Athenians reminded them of the Persian danger, that the Spartans dropped out of their own hegemony and the fact that they did not impose themselves through violence, but the allies offered them to take over the hegemony of the Greeks:

“Due to this fact, we were first forced to form our hegemony at this point, first out of fear, then for honour and later for our interest”

The second concerns the proceeding of the negotiations after Athenians explained why they assumed power and why they refused to renounce it. They argue that Spartans would be forced to do the same actions had they undertaken the leadership.

“We have not done anything different from human nature, accepting the hegemony offered to us and now refusing to abandon, frustrated by the three highest causes: honour, fear and interest”

Combing the two passages, the following structure of thought and, therefore, theory of decisionmaking emerges. The principal causes or incentives for the decision are 1) need (objective factor and connected with the environment of the decision-maker) and 2) human nature (subjective factor). Thereupon, the three elements of honour, fear and interest act as boosters either simultaneously or separately.

Therefore, the first dimension of Thucydides' theory on decision-making can be expressed as follows: humans, due to their nature, need and interest, fear, honour, undertake the development and maintaining of authority/leadership. Each of these causes can operate separately, in different combinations or all together.

4.3 2nd dimension

The second dimension of Thucydides' theory concerns how, why, and when decision-makers end up making wrong decisions that lead to dangers. There are five variables: audacity, arrogance, rage, hope and luck. These do interconnect with the other variables presented in the previous parts. The passage that provides the answer: C.45 4-7

“Out of audacity created by need due to poverty, out of greed, produced by hubris, the selfconfidence of power or passions that each time invincibly possess them, humans undertake risks. In any case, desire and hope - the first precedes, the other follows, the first plans the intrigue, the

second submits the idea that luck will help- harm the most and, even though they are invisible, they are more powerful than the visible evils”

“Alongside them, luck does not contribute less in leading humans to conceit because, sometimes, it is unexpectedly presented and pushes some to risk the greatest goods, such as their freedom or their authority over others, since, alongside others, each one overestimates his power. Simply put, it is impossible, and it is foolish for someone to believe that human nature can be deterred either by the laws or by any other fear when desired to do something”

4.4 Conclusion

The theory presented in the previous parts can be summed up to the following: humans, due to their nature, need and due to interests, fear and honour, seek to acquire and preserve power/authority. Moreover, humans, due to their nature, need, and power in a possible combination with luck, circumstances and arrogance dare, become obsessed, become greedy, and have unfounded hope resulting in them being led to wrong decisions and danger.

The first dimension explains the behaviour of people concerning power, while the second explains why people (not only because of the will for power) get involved in risky situations which have costly consequences. Therefore, Thucydides' theory provides an answer to the question of why people in general and particularly decision-makers make wrong decisions. This theory is predominantly subjective, i.e. it focuses mainly on the personal characteristics of those who make decisions.

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5. Geopolitical approach to IR

5.1 Geopolitics

Geopolitics is the study of international relations from a spatial or geographical perspective. Classical geopolitics treats geographical space as an existential pre-condition for all politics, for which reason it must serve as the point of departure for all political analysis and policy formulation. Geopolitics constitutes a science that utilizes a holistic and descriptive method of geographical analysis (spatial dimension) of specific socio-political situations of power (human presence and activity) studied in terms of their spatial setting.

Given its theoretical core, geopolitics can arguably be considered a particular form of realism based on the influence of the natural environments defined by geography and technology. Geopolitics applies the following tools: economic geography, political geography, cultural geography, national-state geography, and geography of control and distribution of information.

Geopolitical prediction patterns of redistribution of power result from synthesizing conclusions in the four geopolitical pillars of power: defence and security, policy, and culture/information in the geographical area and under the ideological context that covers them.

Geopolitics has great explanatory potential as long as it does not fall to the level of simplistic geographical determinism. When geopolitical models are used to create plans of strategic action, it becomes geostrategy. In recent decades the classical geopolitics approach has been complemented by the notion that problems with a global impact are best approached by considering the world as a whole.

5.2 Geostrategy

Geostrategy is not a science. It incorporates both geopolitics and historically rooted national impulses in the formulation of long-term prescriptive strategies. Geostrategy merges strategic considerations with geopolitical factors. While geopolitics is ostensibly neutral — examining the geographic and political features of different regions, especially the impact of geography on politics — geostrategy involves comprehensive planning, assigning means for achieving national goals or securing assets of military or political significance.

In other words, it uses the tools offered by geopolitics to realize models of strategic action, providing the practical ways in which the respective predictions will take place, obtaining the ideological political goals of the state. Therefore, it aims to inform, constrain, or affect political and military planning. Geostrategists, as distinct from geopoliticians, approach geopolitics from a nationalist point of view rather than from a scientific one.

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6. Power

6.1 The basic concept

Power is the currency of international relations. It is a psychological relationship between conflicting wills that both aspire to the deviation of the other from its original course of action without using actual force.

Thus, power is the ability to get others to behave in ways that they ordinarily would not by encouraging certain actions and prohibiting others. That is achieved either by exercising pressure toward a state's interests or manipulating the factors that determine its policy. Power has also been defined as the ability to a) cause outcomes that would not have taken place otherwise, b) change the highly probable outcomes, c) participate in the decision making process and d) alter the changes that would have taken place otherwise.

This is the dynamic form of power. Power can be viewed as strength as well, which implies the static side and refers to the states' capabilities and how states wield actual or potential influence and coercion. In this context, power is the strength that can be used effectively. Power can also be expressed as influence, and therefore it exists even when it is not being used; that is, when it is static. Deterrence is an example. The power of the state that deters is influencing the decision of its rival to not attack without actually actively using its power.

However, a state's power does not exist in a vacuum but inside the international system, and thus it is just a part of the international distribution of power. Therefore, states' power is always viewed in correlation to the others' power. A state can possess at the same time more, less or equal power than its adversaries.

6.2 Balance of power

The balance of power is the core theory of international politics within the realist perspective. There can be found up to 9 different ways in which the balance of power concept can be interpreted:

- 1) Every even or uneven distribution of power between states or coalitions;
- 2) an endeavour to balance another actor's power;
- 3) a situation in which the allocation of power does not allow any state to enforce its will to the others (equilibrium of power);
- 4) a state of hegemony or the pursuit of it;
- 5) stability and peace in the system;
- 6) instability and war;
- 7) power politics;
- 8) a universal law that exists throughout history and operates like a mechanism to achieve the balance of power;
- 9) a method and a practical guide for politicians. Still, the first three are the most prominent ones.

The second approach refers to the effort of a nation in the context of a self-help system to protect itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power against the power of the other side. The kind of balance of power described by the third approach can be found in a bipolar and multipolar system. On the one hand, the Cold war is an example of a balance of power between 2 actors, none of whom can prevail militarily. On the other hand, the European balance of power that followed the treaty of Westphalia is a perfect case of a balance of power in a multipolar world.

6.3 Soft power

The soft power concept was first developed by Joseph Nye, who elaborated what Thucydides has described as honour. Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion. It is the ability to shape the preferences of others, making them want the same thing that you want. It can be explained as “direct communication with foreign peoples, to affect their thinking, and ultimately, that of their governments”.

Soft power is the product of a country’s foreign and domestic policy behaviour and style, its cultural values and how these are diffused abroad, its political principles, and its adherence to global undisputed norms and values. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political values, and policies. Public diplomacy and nation branding are used to project further a state’s soft power in the international system.

One of the problems of soft power is its inability to be measured. It is not possible to prove that a state changes its behaviour and actions because of another state’s soft power. Soft power also tends to have diffuse effects on the outside world and is not easily wielded to achieve specific outcomes.

6.4 Smart power

Power is one’s ability to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants. Hard power rests primarily on coercion and payment. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payments.

The term “smart power” was developed by Joseph Nye in 2003 to counter the misinterpretation that soft power alone produces effective foreign policy. Smart power refers to power conversion strategies that effectively combine hard and soft power in different contexts. It means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve a state’s objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skilful combination of both.

It is an evaluative term applied to the effectiveness of strategies rather than a distinct type of power. The smart power approach underscores the necessity of a strong military but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand state influence and establish the legitimacy of its action.

6.5 Sharp power

Sharp power refers to the aggressive and subversive policies employed by authoritarian governments (which cannot be described as either hard power, soft power, or smart power) that target liberal democracies to undermine their ideals and mindsets. In other words, it is the devious use of information (manipulation and misinformation of public opinion) for hostile purposes.

Authoritarian states seek to penetrate the informational and political environments of their targets, aiming not to exercise soft power but to direct the desired audience through manipulation or distortion of the information it has access to. Sharp power takes advantage of the asymmetry between free and unfree systems, allowing authoritarian regimes to limit free expression and distort political environments in democracies while simultaneously shielding their own domestic public spaces from democratic appeals coming from abroad.

Beyond politics, the corrosive effects of sharp power are increasingly apparent in the spheres of culture, academia, media, and publishing— sectors that are crucial in determining how citizens of democracies understand the world around them.

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7. Polarity

7.1 Unipolarity

The term unipolarity is used to describe a system with only one great power and its close allies, whose power and capabilities outweigh by far that of all the other states in the system. Power is not so concentrated as to produce a global empire, though. In any case, unipolarity should be distinguished from hegemony and empire, terms that refer to political relationships and degrees of influence rather than to distributions of material capabilities.

The unipole feels a compulsion to seek more because increased power brings new fears, leading to excessive expansion. It is not only hubris that leads it to be concerned with everything but the identification of its national interest with everything that happens in the world for the sake of its security.

7.2 Bipolarity

Bipolarity describes the condition in which there are two major poles in the system or two alliances-blocks-coalitions under the leadership of two antagonistic powers. In a two-power competition, a loss for one appears as a gain for the other, and thus they both perceive their antagonism as a zero-sum game. Overreaction by either or both of the great powers is the source of danger in a bipolar world. Bipolarity encourages the two great powers to turn unwanted events into crises.

Factors that give stability to bipolar systems:

- 1) There are few chances for conflict, and there is only one possible pair of great powers that can fight each other.
- 2) Power is more likely to be evenly distributed, and there are few chances for the great powers to cooperate against smaller states.
- 3) Wrong calculations are discouraged.

7.3 Multipolarity

Multipolarity describes a system in which there are more than two great powers. It is the most common type of polarity throughout history. Power in multipolar systems tends to be unequally distributed due to the existence of many great powers. However, the disparities of power in a multipolar system can be managed by balancing actions. No state can dominate the other if they form a balancing coalition against it.

According to Hans Morgenthau, the advantage of multipolarity is reflected in the triangle flexibility- uncertainty-prudence. From the multiplicity of actors derives flexibility (in the soft game of alliances), which enhances uncertainty, the latter being a source of prudence in the behaviour of states.

Factors of instability

- A) The number of potential collisions is high.

B) The maintenance of the balance of power is hard.

C) The potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations is high.

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8. Strategic theory

8.1 Grand strategy

Grand strategy is the highest level of national statecraft that manages all the state's available resources towards the means of its long-term political ends. In other words, it establishes how states, or other political units, prioritize and mobilize their military, diplomatic, political, economic, and other sources of power to ensure their interests. A grand strategy has the potential to be successful if it meets the following criteria:

- 1) Careful “read” of the international environment as well as the opportunities and the threats that exist or may arise.
- 2) Setting of the political goals that the grand strategy is going to pursue on the basis of the available means.
- 3) Laying down the most effective combination of means for the attainment of hierarchical policy objectives
- 4) Careful configuration of the grand strategy's image so that it is legitimized both internally and externally.

8.2 Military strategy

Strategy can be defined as the coupling of means and ends in light of a real or potential confrontation. It is based on the triangle means-goals-adversary. Military strategy refers to the use of all available military means of a state for the attainment of its political goals in light of a real or potential confrontation. The operational art refers to the use of military units towards their set target in the context of a campaign in the theater of a branch of military operations. Tactics refers to the use of military units towards their set target in the context of a battle.

8.3 National narrative

A national narrative can be defined as the combination of a nation's cultural identity with its state's claims in the international system in accordance with the chances that arise and the pressures it bears. National narratives are the answer to the question of why a state exists since in a way, they are based on its cultural identity, its past, the features that differentiate it from other nations and they aspire to promote its vision, its goals, and the direction in which it is going to pursue its interests, thus leaving a mark in the system.

National narratives provide the state with an orientation, enabling it to focus its power in a specific direction and legitimizing its aspirations (domestic as well as international) in the eyes of its citizens. Equally, national narratives justify state action in the international public opinion so that they are not seen as completely arbitrary.

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9. State strategies

9.1 Balancing

Balancing is a strategy adopted by a state when it assumes responsibility to prevent the attempt of an aggressor state to change in its favour the current balance of power between the two. Therefore, it is a strategic option that aims to increase a state's power to successfully face the power of another state or the threat that an adversary state or a group of states pose to it. It can be divided into two forms: internal and external balancing.

Internal balancing constitutes the predominant strategy adopted inside an anarchic international system, where states are driven towards self-help. It includes a state's efforts to upgrade its capabilities by intensifying its effort to make the best out of its domestic sources of power. By resting upon the exclusive mobilization of its own resources, the balancing state aspires to acquire enough power, which will enable it to survive and maintain the current balance of power.

External balancing deals with forming alliances and coalitions, which aim to increase the state's actual power through its cooperation with other states with common needs, interests, and enemies. Above all, it is the cooperative effort of some actors against the common threat posed by another actor.

Overall, internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external balancing. States are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths than they are to misjudge the strength and reliability of opposing coalitions. On the other hand, internal balancing presupposes a longer period than external balancing, which can be realized quickly. Nevertheless, in most cases, both kinds of balancing are combined.

9.2 Coercion

Coercion lies in one state's attempt to secure benefits from another state by compelling its government to think or act in a certain way using the threat of violence. This threat, alongside the controlled escalation of a crisis, forces the adversary to comply with the will of the coercive state. Therefore, coercion is the change of the status quo through the threat of violence.

This strategy provides states with the ability to achieve their goals or inflict damage on the opponent without employing brute force, which differentiates it from the concept of attack. For the coercion strategy to be successful, it must not end in war. There are two main prerequisites for it to work correctly.

1) The state that adopts a coercive strategy (state A) must have enough military power so that the pressure being put on the adversary (state B) is combined with the high probability of A winning in a military clash in case it loses control of the crisis' escalation. The relativity of the cost is just as important as in the case of deterrence. A has to put B into a situation where it will face a greater cost if it does not comply with the compelling threat than if it does. In this way, A has the escalation dominance, i.e. the ability to constantly increase the cost of non-compliance of B until it destroys B, which cannot do the same. This being the case, the national interest of B will eventually force it to choose the least detrimental option, which is compliance with its enemy's demands.

2) A has to have a strong incentive but also display its existence to B. B has to know that A possesses the means and the will to carry out its threats. In this way, the threats' credibility is enhanced, resulting in them becoming a crucial factor in the decisions made by B.

9.3 Deterrence

Deterrence is the ability of one state to cancel a non-desired action from another state. More specifically, deterrence is a state's threat to use military force to influence another state's behaviour and prevent the other state from adopting an aggressive attitude. The deterrent state aims at maintaining the status quo through the threat of the use of force. Therefore, non-violence is what distinguishes it from defence.

A key element of deterrence is the concept of relative cost. The cost that is to be inflicted on the aggressor should exceed any possible benefit he could gain if he pursued the altering of the status quo. Deterrence is not the result of persuasion but the result of the deterrent state's threat and consequently of the fear of the state that is being deterred regarding the consequences of using force against it.

Thus, the adversary is not persuaded by arguments or logic but is pushed or forced into a particular behaviour out of fear. In this context, the threat is balanced only by another threat. That is because the one who wants war is not necessarily willing to achieve victory at any cost. The threat mainly targets the opponent's psychology, seeking to curb his will. It must a) be clearly stated, b) clearly define the limits of the opponent's actions and c) be credible. However, the credibility of the deterrent state's threat and the value of the cost from the deterred one are subjective.

To say that country A deters country B from doing something is to imply the following: 1) that A conveys to B a threat to inflict punishment or deprivation of values if it embarks on a particular course of action; 2) that B might otherwise embark on that course of action; 3) that B believes that A has the capacity and the will to carry out the threat, and decides for this reason that the course of action is not worthwhile.

9.4 Mutual deterrence

Mutual deterrence is a psychological and subjective state of affairs in which two or more powers deter each other from doing something. For it to exist, three conditions have to be met: The two states prevent each other's actions using threats. Had these threats be absent, these actions would take place. Mutual threats are clear and credible, and each side perceives them as such.

Potential opponents are hesitant in the face of possible disaster because the prospect of winning against an opponent with equal strength is uncertain. In other words, the cost of a war between relatively equal opponents tends to be prohibitive. No state that acts in its interests will act in a way that will cost it more than the expected benefit. Thus, the two opponents are forced to coexist without any of them retreating from their positions. Deterrence is reconciliation between those who do not reconcile.

9.5 Divide and rule

"Divide and rule" is a strategy that allows a state to face its adversary indirectly. There are three different branches of it: a) bait and bleed, b) buck-passing, and c) alliance prevention.

9.5.1 Buck passing

Buck-passing is an alternative to balancing strategy, in which a state is eager to face the power of a potential adversary indirectly. It is a defensive approach that rests on conveying the cost to third parties. It can be used in several situations, such as when a state faces more than one enemy. In Buck-passing, the state realizes the need to stop the empowerment of its enemy. Still, it searches for another state to face it, either because it is not strong enough to do it by itself or because it wants to avoid the cost that a confrontation would bring.

That is done: 1) by keeping good relations with the adversary so that an early crisis is avoided, 2) by distancing itself from the "victim" so that it is not carried into the war if it erupts, and 3) by choosing a powerful enough state to play that role to pose a threat to its rival, thus forcing him to focus on it. If it succeeds, its rival ends up contained without any involvement of the first state and with zero cost. However, failure can come in two different forms.

First, the victim may not manage to contain the enemy, which results in him becoming even stronger and thus a bigger threat. Second, the victim may acquire much power through that process and end up posing a threat too. In case of failure, the "victim" or the enemy may end up too empowered.

9.5.2 Bait and bleed

"Bait and bleed" is one strategy that allows a state to face its adversary indirectly. It is an aggressive approach that aims to increase the state's relative power, which starts the process. That is achieved by weakening its opponents by exacerbating their discrepancies, causing a rivalry between them or a confrontation.

Moreover, this strategy can be used in an already existent conflict, in which case, the state tries to increase the duration of the conflict and the damage the two sides inflict on each other. It is a low-cost strategy and at the same time a high-uncertainty one. If it succeeds, the country that enacts it does not wear out, and its relative power increases while it stays on the margin. If it fails, the state's relations with its enemies are worsened, and the antagonism augments. Multipolar systems provide fertile ground for this kind of strategy.

9.5.3 Alliance prevention

"Alliance prevention" aims to not allow the empowerment of the adversary through the establishment of an alliance. The cost of this approach is equivalent to the means used. If the state uses diplomacy, then failure signifies the creation of the enemy alliance. However, if military means are used, the antagonism between the two sides increases, and the first state receives a blow to its status

9.5.4 Rally round the flag

A "rally round the flag" effect is the sudden and substantial increase in the government's public approval in times of war. Only wars (or other spectacular events like a large-scale terrorist attack or pandemics) consistently provoke sizable rallies. These significant events elicit an emotional reaction from citizens and a self-identification with the nation.

The mental connection between society and the government is crucial in the face of a crisis. It results in society and political elite standing together and sharing the predominance in the war as their primary goal, thus enhancing social cohesion. Moreover, the stronger this connection becomes, the more viable the government ends up. On the contrary, if this mental connection is absent, the state will collapse under the war effort's weight and intensity.

The rally phenomenon is usually measured as a surge of public approval for the head of state when the nation is involved in an international crisis. Two hypotheses have been offered for why this surge of support occurs: (1) patriotism, as individuals respond to a threat by identifying with an in-group, in this case, the nation and its president. Patriotism holds that citizens rally to the president in times of international crisis as the anthropomorphic symbol of national unity- a kind of living flag.

The president becomes the focus of national attention, symbolizing national unity and power. (2) Opinion leadership, as the information environment changes because opposition leaders fall silent or support the president during a crisis and a portion of the public follows those elite partisan leads. However, public opinion does not praise the president's policy itself, citizens just rally around him out of need, and thus it is only a temporary phenomenon.

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10. Security dilemma

10.1 Security dilemma

The security dilemma is a condition in which states in a self-help system, unsure of one another's intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion where the insecurity of others rises as each state interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.

Having armed for the sake of security, other states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to anyone's security is a threat to someone else, who in turn responds by arming. In the anarchical international system, the primary goal of states is to maximize their security. Even if states focus solely on this goal and have no intention of harming others, many of the actions taken by states to increase their security will decrease the security of others.

Decreasing the security of others does not automatically place the state in a dilemma, but because of the anarchic structure, other states will follow suit if one state arms. They cannot know whether the arming state will use its increased military capabilities for an attack in the future. For this reason, they will either choose to increase their military capabilities to reestablish the balance of power, or they will launch a preemptive attack to prevent the arming state from upsetting the balance in the first place.

If they choose the first option, the result may be a security spiral, which is an action-reaction process, where two states are tied in an armaments race with each state responding to increases in weapons procurement and defence expenditure by the other state, leading them both to arm more and more heavily. This may lead to war in the long run. If they choose the last option, military conflict will be imminent.

10.2 Misperception

The phenomenon of misperception falls within the psychological theories of decision making. Simply put, it is a state of affairs in which an actor's perceptions of the world, of other actors, and their actions diverge from reality. Misperception can either stem from states naturally trying to deceive each other or from psychological factors.

That being said, it is the direct product of inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of consequences, misjudgments about how others will react to one's policies, misjudgments of another state's intentions, motives, and misinterpretation of the realities faced by another state. The state of misperception is always present in the international system and affects the actions of states through its influence upon their leaders/governments.

Henceforth, it can often lead to a security dilemma or even war by creating overestimates and underestimates of hostility. Robert Jervis has made several hypotheses concerning some psychological factors that often result in misperceptions.

1. decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories
2. decision-makers remain attached to a particular opinion and disregard new pieces of information that do not conform with them

3. an actor's perceptual thresholds are influenced by what he has experienced and learned about
4. a state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger
5. the way people perceive data is influenced not only by their theories about other actors but also by what they are concerned with at the time they receive the information;
6. there is an overall tendency for decision-makers to see other states as more hostile than they are
7. actors tend to see the behaviour of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is
8. states tend to take the foreign office's position for the stand of the other government as a whole
9. actors tend to overestimate the degree to which others are acting in response to what they do when the others behave in accordance with the actor's desires; but when the behaviour of the other is undesired, it is usually seen as derived from internal forces
10. when actors have intentions that they do not try to conceal from others, they tend to assume that others accurately perceive these intentions
11. it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace
12. actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent with their theories may also be compatible with different views.

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11. Game theory

11.1 Introduction

Game theory deals with the analysis of strategic situations, defined as situations of interdependence between rational actors, through the use of mathematical models. It has been extremely useful in the field of international relations as it highlights the issues of mistrust and the lack of cooperation that emerge in situations of conflicting interests.

These games involve two players, who both have two available options regarding their course of action. There is also the precondition that both players are rational regarding their decisionmaking process. There are three types of games: zero-sum, non-zero-sum and mixed ones. We will analyse the following games: the Chicken game (mixed), the prisoner's dilemma (non-zero-sum) and the war of attrition game (zero-sum= a competition context inside of which each player gets exactly what the other player loses).

11.2 Chicken game

The Chicken game theory is a mixed one in terms of sum. The name "chicken" has its origins in a game in which two drivers drive towards each other on a collision course. As the two drivers speed towards each other, the first driver to turn off the road is the "chicken" and subsequent loser of the game.

In the Chicken model, the notion of cooperating is equated to swerving off the road, while defecting is equated to continuing straight toward the opposing car. For each player, the choice to defect while the other cooperates is the best possible decision. This implies that the actor who defects wins the game while the cooperating actor swerves off the road and loses the game.

The second-best outcome for either player would be mutual cooperation to prevent the dangers and costs of defecting. The second worst outcome would be cooperating and losing the game while one's opponent defects and wins. The worst outcome would be mutual defection, which would result in a head-on collision and extreme damage for both sides.

In international politics, the chicken game refers to a dangerous game in which countries try not to compromise until the enemy backs up first. The Chicken game theory was used in the Cuban Missile Crisis during the Cold War to depict the clash between the two superpowers. In that context, the worst outcome would be a nuclear war.

11.3 Prisoner's dilemma

The prisoner's dilemma is a non-zero-sum game. It demonstrates the cooperation problems that arise in circumstances of antagonistic interests and lack of information. It is a paradigm in which the reward for unilateral noncooperation exceeds both the benefit from mutual cooperation and the cost of mutual conflict.

Two prisoners, A and B, suspected of committing a robbery together, are isolated and urged to confess. Simultaneously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner can either betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime or cooperate with the other by remaining silent. Both prisoners, however, know the consequences of their decisions: (1) if both confess, both go to jail for five years; (2) if neither confesses, both go to jail for one year; and (3)

if one confesses while the other does not, the confessor goes free and the silent one goes to jail for 20 years.

Although A cannot be sure what B will do, he knows that he does best to confess when B confesses and when B remains silent; B will reach the same conclusion. So, the solution would seem to be that each prisoner does best to confess and go to jail for five years. Paradoxically, however, the two robbers would do better if they both adopted the apparently irrational strategy of remaining silent.

The central characteristic of this game is that, although the parties could enjoy mutual benefits by cooperating, the logic of their situation forces them into conflict and mutual losses. Assuming both players are rational and act only according to self-interest, there is no way of escaping this outcome. An example of a real prisoner's dilemma would be a disarmament agreement in which the two states end up breaching the deal's terms as they don't trust each other. That is not the best solution since the acquisition of weapons has a substantial economic cost. Still, it is not the worst outcome in the sense that none will end up being deceived.

11.4 War of attrition

The war of attrition game is a zero-sum game. It describes every situation in which each actor expects the other to make the wrong decision. The game depicts a conflict scenario between guerilla fighters (player 2) and the tactical army (player 1). The guerillas have the advantage in guerilla warfare through attrition, while the army is better structured for a battle in its fortified position. There are, consequently, four possible outcomes depending on each player's choices.

If player 2 conducts an attrition operation in the fortified position of player 1, then the latter will acquire small gains (+0.5) while player 2 will have minor losses (-0.5). If player 2 makes the mistake of advancing straight to the fortified position for a battle, player 1 will emerge victorious (+8) while player two will have maximum losses (-8). In the case where the army (player 1) commits the mistake of going out of its position and confronts the attrition strategy of the guerillas (player 2), then the latter will deal the biggest blow (+7) to player 1, who will be destroyed (-7).

The last possible outcome is when player 1 chooses wrongly to fight out of its fortified position (-5), and player 2 also commits the mistake of giving a proper battle (+5). Here, the winner is player 2 due to the terrain advantage, but the guerillas did not achieve maximum gains because they did not use their most effective strategy. The game's gains and losses urge both players to adopt a waiting strategy. Therefore, the most logical thing is that they will end up in the first outcome (+0.5,-0.5). That is because each will wait until the other commits the big mistake to acquire maximum gains.

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12. War theory

12.1 War

War belongs to the province of social life. Insofar as it is a social act, it presupposes the conflicting wills of politically organized collectivities. We could compare it with business competition, which is also a conflict of human interests. However, war is a conflict of great interests settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from other types of conflict. It is the continuation of political commerce by other means.

Therefore, war is the product of organized violence carried on by political units against each other. Violence is not war unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit and is directed against another political unit. War is not a single act in that it is not isolated from the actor's political actions and objectives. Instead, it manifests political relations in another dimension, using a different set of means.

War is a political action; it rises from a political situation and results from a political motive. It is an act of organized violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will. War is the means, whereas the compulsory submission of the enemy to our preference is the ultimate object. Thus, war is not an end in itself but a real political instrument through which states can achieve their goals in the international system. Hence, it is a calculated and conscious use of organized violence aiming at the political entity's defence and survival and the security of its interests in the international system.

12.2 Democratic peace theory

The democratic peace theory has its roots in the liberalist and neoliberalist paradigms and holds that democracies do not fight other democracies. It is usually backed up by historical evidence found in modern history. In fact, the theory's central idea can be traced back to Kant's Perpetual Peace. The belief that democracies constitute a zone of peace rests on a perceived high correlation between governmental form and international outcome. Therefore, its supporters suggest that intentional uniformity (all states becoming liberal democratic) can cause international peace. As a result, democracies are justified in fighting non-democracies because, in this way, they contribute to the preservation of peace.

The democratic peace theory is being based on the above arguments: 1) Democratic states act morally, since societies are fair to each other (and in this case, societies have the power), and show mutual understanding; 2) the democratic culture of consent in internal politics is being externalized in international relations; 3) the decision making procedures are transparent, and thus it is challenging for an actor to initiate a surprise attack; 4) war is prevented because it implies political cost to a democratically elected government and 5) democratic countries do not need war, like authoritarian regimes do, as a distraction of the people from the internal political situation.

Nevertheless, the democratic peace theory has been criticized a lot. Its most profound critics are the following: 1) the correlation of the variables is not proven, and many suggest their inversion, that is, war becoming the independent variable and democracy the dependent. In other words, it is the absence of an external threat that provides the conditions for the existence and growth of democracies and not the opposite; 2) even if all states became democratic; the system would

remain anarchic and thus war-prone; 3) the public opinion's view regarding which states can be considered entirely democratic is being based on substantial interest. An objective classification of the above is complicated anyway. A liberal democracy at war with another country is unlikely to call it a liberal democracy.

12.3 Hegemonic war

Hegemonic war can be defined as the kind of war that puts at stake the international system and threatens to transform its structure. There are two types of hegemonic war. First, when the actor/s that already have a hegemonic position in the system initiate a war against a potential antagonist (state or coalition), whose power causes them to fear for their security and their primary and beneficial position in the system. In other words, they try not to allow another state climb to their own level of relative power, thus maintaining the advantageous status quo.

Second, when a revisionist actor or coalition initiate a war in order to catch up with the level of the other great powers and alter the status quo in his/their own interest. Both cases can also start as a normal war and end up as a hegemonic one due to the fact that 1) the normal war winner scares all the other powers and 2) the normal war winner grabs the chance to better secure his interests through the continuation of organized violence against other powers.

12.4 Revolutionary war

Revolutionary war is the evolution of a hegemonic war and refers to the extreme revisionism of a state (or coalition) that uses the process of war as a tool for the complete restructuring of the international system and the establishment of itself into a dominus solus. The above is not a rational choice for those who have not enough power to achieve it. In other words, the goals surpass the available means.

Due to the unlimited nature of the state's goal, the power it needs to use is also unlimited, which results to the state being irrational and the war losing its politician nature. That is because war is no longer a tool in the name of the state's political ends but war happens for the sake of war and the state becomes just a tool in that process.

12.5 Preemptive war

Preemptive war is the begging of a war initiative against the proven will of the adversary to resort to the use of violence before he launches the first blow himself. It has to do with destroying a potential and direct threat (within weeks, days or hours) before it is materialised.

Let's assume that state B is at the final stage of its military mobilisation to strike state A soon. State A has perceived the immediacy of the threat and chooses to strike first to gain the military initiative of the first blow and, therefore, to avoid a generalised war. When we get to a preemptive war scenario, the avoidance of the war and the non-use of violence have already been excluded, and deterrence has failed. Hence, we are leading to a sure confrontation. Illustrative example: Six-Day War

12.6 Preventive war

Preventive war has to do with destroying a potential and long-term threat before it is materialised. It aims to weaken the pillars of power of the adversary using organised violence and forcefully

halt his empowerment in the international system. It is grounded on the principle that the percentage of violence that needs to be used to weaken the adversary is relatively less than that necessary to face him when he has arrived at a higher level of empowerment.

Let's assume that state A realises that its deterrence efforts against state B do not have the preferred outcome. B continues to empower itself, resulting in increasing A's security dilemma. A decides to attack B to forcibly stop its strengthening procedure in the long run State A has diagnosed that its balance of power with state B will develop against it over time. It considers B a potential enemy- regardless of B's intentions- and strikes while the balance of power is still relatively favourable. Illustrative example: Peloponnesian War

12.7 War friction

According to Clausewitz' approach, friction refers to the below-mentioned data that influence the conduct of one war: Uncertainty, mistakes, accidents, technical difficulties, unpredictable elements and the results of all these upon the decisions, moral, and actions of the whole army during the war.

Due to friction, in war, an action always varies partly or wholly from the plans. Friction is more influential where the war action in its total cannot be concentrated in a single and principal operation without interruption, but it has to break down into individual actions/steps. Through the concept of friction, Clausewitz proves that war and its result cannot be analysed in the same way as a mathematical problem. Therefore, its outcome cannot be predicted before its start based on the power correlation of the warring parties.

12.8 Logistics of war

Clausewitz suggests that the art of war is the art of using all the available means in the battle. Making a comprehensive approach to the phenomenon of war, he includes in it all the actions that take place for the sake of the war, like the creation of the military forces, the concentration of the army, its equipment, its supplies, and its training.

Henceforth, logistics, in military science, all the activities of armed-force units in roles supporting combat units, including transport, supply, signal communication, medical aid, and the like. Logistics of war refer to the conduct of a war, its preparation and its maintaining.

The action of war includes all the activities that serve it, which are differentiated from it per se and are associated with the maintenance of the armed forces. Therefore, the concept of war involves both the war itself and all the parallel actions that the state is performing to conduct the war. The more organised the logistics are, the more probable is a victorious outcome of the war. Moreover, effective logistics are reducing friction and its effects.

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13. Hybrid warfare

13.1 Introduction

There is no consensus in the hybrid warfare literature regarding what the term actually refers to. Instead, hybrid war has become a catchall phrase. The theory of hybrid warfare can be categorized into three branches. We will make the categorization using the different levels of strategy to comprehend each definition's essence better.

Why did this confusion arise? Hybrid: Thing made combining several different elements. We usually give names to things made by a combination of other things- we do not say a hybrid of x and y but z, for example, to recognize what we are talking about. Blue+yellow= green. Every possible combination of yellow and blue will have its name; none is called a hybrid of blue and green.

Therefore, the issue is that when the first definition of hybrid warfare was born, we did not give it a name resulting in other definitions of, sometimes much different things, to fit under the notion of hybrid warfare as well. It is like saying "new warfare", but that term may involve many diverse "new warfare" ways.

Simultaneously, we broke up some earlier hybrid terms, which already had a distinguished name, for example, grand strategy (which involves both actions of violence and peaceful ones to achieve its goal) and tactics (which involved both conventional and unconventional ways of fighting).

Analysts have not agreed upon whether the hybrid warfare concept is something new or not or whether it is useful or not. That is because all wars in the past have contained elements of 'hybridity', and most have been characterized by episodes of illegality and 'unconventional' methods.

13.2 Tactics definition

Frank Hoffman originally addressed the concept of hybrid warfare as purely something in the military realm (clearly in the operational and tactical level of military strategy), which, therefore, should be dealt with by the military. Hoffman's definition: an adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the battlespace to obtain its political objectives.

He described asymmetrical tactics (a combination of new technologies and fanatical fighting) of non-state or sub-state forces (irregulars, guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists) without state structures, uniforms of obedience to the laws of armed conflict. The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict of 2006 offered an inspiration. At the same time, hybrid warfare can utilize its features to produce vagueness in times of peace by offering the ability to pursue strategic ends with a degree of force, but not such an overt use of coercion that it would cross the threshold of conventional justifications for war.

Concentrating on the tactical level, David Kilcullen described hybrid warfare as the combination of state and irregular forces that employ any variety of weapons and tactics to minimize detection and retaliation. Therefore, hybrid warfare does also blur the distinction between war and peace and combatants and non-combatants.

Conclusively, this definition of hybrid warfare is anything but new since 1) even in classical conventional wars, there was plenty of unconventional activity along with the combination of regular and irregular forces on the battlefield, and 2) there are historical examples of actors that used violence at the tactical level to pursue their goals without crossing the threshold where their enemy would be justified to proceed to war.

13.3 Grand strategy definition

The second definition of hybrid warfare is was born in 2010 from NATO-Brussels-> first broader definition -> grand strategy level. 2015 International institute for strategic studies ISS -> hybrid threats include military and nonmilitary tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, cease the initiative, and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means, sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations covered and occasionally overt military and intelligence actions and economic pressure.

They also involve protracted forms of warfare, use of proxy forces for coercion and intimidation, terrorism and criminality to manipulate the information environment, target energy resources, attack economic vulnerabilities and exploit diplomatic leverage. This interpretation falls under the grand strategy level because it refers to a combination of peaceful and violent means to realize the actor's end. Grand strategy encompasses both military strategy (war) and political means (political branch of grand strategy).

In fact, this concept refers to the complimentary use of selective violence along with political means (political disturbance, social mobilization, political or economic assault, immigration and culture), causing ordinary people and military alike to be greatly astonished at the fact that commonplace things that are close to them can also become weapons with which to engage in war.

Conclusively, neither this definition offers anything new because war objectives are always political, and the use of force is not restricted to conventional warfighting. In that sense, all wars are hybrid since the way they are fought (grand strategy) contains the military plus all the other available political means during the war.

13.4 Political warfare definition

In 2015, a new term entered the discussion after the Crimea crisis. It is largely a Russian term, which was, among others, developed in Gerasimov Doctrine. We will call it "magnifying glass" hybrid warfare. This definition exists in the dimension of political warfare. It implies bloodless, contactless warfare that removes hard military power (strategic level), utilizing cyberspace and "information blitzkrieg" to break the enemy's resistance without fighting. This interpretation of hybrid warfare involves:

- 1) Activities that exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution, as well as the different interfaces (war-peace, internal-external security, local-state, and national-international)
- 2) Activities aimed at influencing different forms of decision-making of the target and fulfil the actor's strategic goals
- 3) Corrupting and undermining the enemy's authority legitimacy from inside to achieve certain political goals without escalating to direct confrontation

- 4) Coordinated and synchronized actions that deliberately target institutions' systemic vulnerabilities through a wide range of means
- 5) Infiltration of subversive, destructive concepts to disrupt the ability of societies to function, essentially sharp power
- 6) Crushing the spirit of the enemy public by destroying objects of physiological value, seizing objects of material value, and creating an impression of order.
- 7) Destroying military capacity, security system and economy, essentially the opposite of regular conventional war.
- 8) Military power only in extreme cases and as a secondary tool only to support political, economic, and physiological dimension

The “magnifying glass” hybrid warfare theory has the below implications for the victim of such an attack: The attacker sets the dimension in which the “fighting” will occur, while the defender is not legitimized using another toolkit or taking the confrontation to another level. Still, they have to respond in kind, given that they possess the capabilities to do so.

They can never be sure about the blow's origins, and therefore, they have no target to hit. But, even if they did, they lack the legitimization to do so because 1) seemingly peaceful actions do not justify a military response against an enemy and 2) they cannot prove it and persuade other states. This theory of hybrid warfare falls within the peaceful branch of grand strategy (since it does not involve any violence) or, put differently, political warfare or, according to Clausewitz, confrontation.

Although political warfare and the attempts to further national interests without triggering armed conflict, and circumventing international norms, have always been a part of states rivalry, this is the only hybrid warfare theory that offers a new concept. That is because the advance in technology and its products (for example, information warfare and cyber-attacks) allow us to synchronize the effects of political warfare actions in such a way that they have a decisive impact. This synchronization effect makes them far more effective than previously, offering a decisive result and achieving the actor's interests by themselves, without the use of force. It works the same way as a magnifying glass, which concentrates sun rays into a specific point in a paper, causing it to catch fire. The sun rays were always there (political warfare tools), but the magnifying glass was not (the means to concentrate/synchronize the rays to achieve one's goal). The development in technology is offering exactly that.

13.5 Information warfare

Information warfare is the use of information in a digital or information age for warfare purposes. It targets the infrastructure, capabilities, and processes by which a state or non-state gathers, analyses, distributes, and exploits information. While the use of information as part of war is as old as war itself—for deception, persuasion, and battlefield communication—the near-universal use of modern, digitized information systems for military decision-making has increased the importance of information's fidelity in the battlespace.

Information operations: the integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities, in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries with the goal of affecting their perception and will.

Their impact can be compared to fire support coordination, in which a targeting methodology synchronizes and employs various capabilities to generate desired effects. Information warfare's effect on the state and the morale of the population can be sometimes comparable with the damage resulting from the effect of weapons of mass destruction.

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14. Diplomacy

14.1 Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the political intercourse among states, which adjusts their differences through negotiations. It is thus the state's primary mechanism to reach agreements. Diplomacy's purpose is to secure the state interests without using force, not the mere ensuring of peace. Nevertheless, diplomacy can indeed establish peace for a certain period, providing that all parties have the goodwill to comply with the agreements made.

Diplomacy can constitute an alternative to war, which would otherwise erupt, only if the conflicting sides have relatively equal power. In general terms, diplomacy promotes the state's economic and commercial interests and, at the same time, it is a source of power through its signed treaties and its acquired prestige. As a result, it functions as a deterrent to possible enemies.

In times of peace, diplomacy's role is to shed light on the state's path by searching for opportunities and detecting threats. Moreover, it provides the political authority with information on the possible conclusion of future treaties. In times of war, diplomacy becomes a transmitter of messages towards the international system.

Its purpose is 1) to foreclose the foe from sources of external balancing; 2) to construct a framework of communication with neutral actors to maintain cooperation with them and, why not, persuade them to enter the war on its side; 3) to prepare the state's smooth transition to the peace period and its peaceful reintegration into the international system after the war's end.

That said, diplomacy also fights in the war, using, instead of arms, deception to mislead the enemy regarding the state's actual plans. At the same time, it functions in the opposite direction by trying to find a way out of the conflict that will not sacrifice the state's most critical national interests.

14.2 Public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is an instrument that governments use to mobilize their resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments. As its name suggests, it is a public, clear and open procedure. Public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth.

However, if the content of a country's culture, values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that broadcasts them cannot produce soft power. Some countries accomplish almost all of their public diplomacy through actions rather than broadcasting. In any case, these two have to be synchronized in order for the public diplomacy to be credible.

Public diplomacy aims to improve a country's image in the international public opinion and to create a brand name. The state wants to shape international audiences' image about itself according to the projection that it makes. Its effectiveness is measured by minds changed.

14.3 Cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is the methodical use of elements and unique features of a country's culture in the exercise of its external relations. Therefore, it constitutes a tool of state foreign policy, which utilizes culture as a means to a political end.

Cultural diplomacy aims to create a reciprocal relation of trust between states and their citizens through the exercise of legitimate influence. Moreover, it improves the state's image in the eyes of foreign audiences. Cultural diplomacy is part of the wider public diplomacy category since it is a totally open and public procedure and so are the long-term results that it brings. Likewise, it is a source of soft power. It promotes and takes advantage of features like language, cultural achievements, history and the current cultural level of the state's citizens.

14.4 Economic diplomacy

Economic diplomacy is the use of economic relations from states to achieve their goals in the international system. It involves 1) the use of economic means in the pursuit of economic ends, 2) the use of economic means in the pursuit of political ends and 3) the use of political means in the pursuit of economic ends.

Economic means may involve economic sanctions, economic influence, financial incentives and rewards, action inside international and peripheral economic organizations, exports, imports, investments, lending, aid, trade agreements. Economic ends may involve economic prosperity and security, support of businesses along with exports, imports, investments, lending, aid and trade agreements.

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15. Security

15.1 Energy security

Energy security is critical both for the countries that import energy and for the ones that export energy. For the countries that are importing energy the main issue is the availability of energy sources so that they can cover their needs. That is achieved through a) the diversification of the sources of where the energy comes from, b) the diversification of the flows of energy that come to the country and c) the affordability of the prices.

As far as the countries that are exporting energy are concerned, the main issue is the uninterrupted selling of their energy so they can continue getting their money. For them, energy security is linked to a) the diversification of the routes they are using in order to export the energy they produce and b) the diversification of the clients to whom they are selling that energy. In both cases the higher the diversification the higher the energy security

15.2 Biosecurity

Biosecurity is a strategic and integrated approach to analysing and managing relevant risks to human, animal and plant life and health and associated risks for the environment. The overarching goal of biosecurity is to prevent, control and/or manage risks to life and health as appropriate to the particular biosecurity sector.

It is based on recognition of the critical linkages between sectors and the potential for hazards to move within and between sectors, with system-wide consequences. Ultimately the aim is to enhance national ability to protect human health, agricultural production systems, and the people and industries that depend on them.

15.3 Human security

The concept of human security represents both a vertical and a horizontal deepening of the traditional idea of national security. It deals not only with freedom from fear but also with freedom from want.

It is identified from three elements: 1) the importance that it gives to the individual as the point of reference of security; 2) its multidimensional nature; 3) it has been influenced by a) the rejection of economic growth as the main index of development, b) the increase of the internal conflicts, c) the impact of globalization in the spreading of international threats, like terrorism and pandemics, d) the post-Cold war emphasis in human rights and humanitarian intervention.

There are seven main categories of threats to human security:

- Economic security
- Food security
- Health security
- Environmental security
- Personal security

- Community security
- Political security

Economic security requires an assured basic income-usually from productive and profitable work or, in the last resort, from some publicly financed safety net.

Food security means that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food.

Health security: guarantee of minimal protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles.

Environmental security: protection of humans from short-term or long-term damage to nature, human-made threats to wildlife, and deterioration of the natural environment.

Personal security: protection of people from physical violence arising either from the state or from other states, sub-state actors, from domestic violence and exploitation.

Community security: protection of people from the loss of traditional ties and values and the actions of violence from different political, ethnic or other groups.

Political security: ensuring that people live in a society that respects fundamental human rights and provides individuals' and groups' freedom from government attempts to exercise control over ideas and information.

15.4 Cyber-security

15.4.1 Cyber space

Cyberspace is made up of all the existing computer systems and networks, including offline systems whose common feature is the ability to manage them through passwords. It consists of three parts. a) the internet where all interconnected computers are incorporated, including b) the world wide web, which is accessible only through URL, c) a cyber-archipelago which consists of all the computer systems that exist in theoretical isolation, in other words, those that do not connect to the internet and the web.

15.4.2 Cyberweapon

Malicious software is software that is designed to interfere with the functions of a computer. Not all forms of malware are weapons from the perspective of international relations. In terms of national security we are not interested in the vast majority of malware.

Only the below mentioned deserves the title of cyberweapon: Exploitative codes that cause damage that impacts national security, e.g. steal military and engineering secrets or other sensitive information about politicians during a pre-election period. Cyberweapons can be used to destroy uranium-enrichment centrifuges, render inoperable the financial infrastructure, paralyse networks, seize valuable military and trade secrets, steal personal data, and damage the states' political, economic, and military security.

15.4.3 Cyberattack

The term cyber-attack refers to the use of a code to interfere with the operation of a computer system for political or military purposes. Cyberattacks are characterized by the attacker's desire, fulfilment, and ability to disrupt computer operations or destroy material goods through cyberspace.

A cyber-attack can maliciously disable computers, steal data, or use a breached computer to launch other attacks. The result is not necessarily limited to cyberspace. But in addition to rendering the computer system dysfunctional, it can degrade the social, economic or governmental functions that depend on its proper functioning. Cyberattacks can be personalized or generalized, affecting the machines of a specific network or all the devices accessible via the internet, such as DDoS attacks.

15.4.4 Cyber-warfare

In case the results of a cyber attack produce significant physical damage or loss of life, then the action can be called an act of cyber-warfare. To date, no cyber-attack meets this criterion, so there has been no cyber-warfare so far.

Malware is a very effective tool for military success. Still, a cyber-attack may increase but not replace traditional military power. However, some military analysts stress their role, warning that cyberattacks could deactivate advanced weapons systems. Cyber-warfare should not be confused with electronic warfare, which does not involve the use of code to change the operation of a machine but can cause significant damage, for example, through electromagnetic energy.

15.4.5 Cyber-security

Cyber-security consists of measures for the protection of cyberspace from hostile acts. It can also be perceived as a state of affairs, i.e. the absence of intrusions into computer systems and their proper operation. Moreover, the concept includes measures for shielding cyberspace from threats originating from the technical level, i.e., the security and viability of non-cyber-based operations that rely, however, on the provider computer to which they are logically or logically connected.

To the extent that security measures are a field in which the army is involved or have a corresponding impact on military capabilities, it constitutes cyber-defence. Cyber-security includes the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyberspace and organization and user's assets. Organization and user's assets encompass connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in cyberspace.

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16. State categories

16.1 Small states

Small State scholars have found it impossible to agree on a common definition, not even on which criteria they should use to define a state as small. They have also used various names for these states, such as small states, weak states, weak power, and minor power. Nevertheless, it is the same countries that are studied but under different definitions.

There can be found six kinds of approaches: 1) the “I know one when I see one” approach; 2) the quantitative approaches that provide some measurable attributes of states (area, population, GNP) and then set an upper limit to determine who is in and who is out; 3) the perceptions approaches, under which states that perceive themselves as small are also small; 4) the behaviour approaches which classify small states based on the fact that they exhibit a specific type of behaviour; 5) the relational approaches where small is perceived as small to a much bigger and more powerful actor and 6) the residual approaches which claim that small states are those states that are not great powers. That is essentially the common denominator of all the definitional approaches.

Small power as a concept does not say anything about a state’s ability and performance in the international system, but that it holds limited resources and is characterized by higher vulnerability and lower influence compared to the Great Powers. Small powers have to navigate themselves in an anarchical and competitive international system, which they cannot shape. Moreover, the consequences of anarchy are more heavily felt by Small Powers than by Great Powers. Having a smaller margin for time and error than more powerful states, small states must carefully manage their external relations to minimize risks and reduce the impact of policy failures.

There is not a common pattern of Small State behaviour. However, those Small States that maximize their influence follow specific strategies and play roles common to all of them. Their behaviour has usually been conceptualized in the literature under the “small but smart” state.

16.2 Buffer states

A Buffer State is usually a neutral state lying between two powerful and potentially hostile powers. Armed forces of either of the rival powers do not exist in the buffer area, and war often ensues when either or both of the powers try to invade the territory of the buffer state. Still, the existence of a buffer state may allow for the rival countries to solve their problems through peaceful negotiations and diplomatic actions instead of engaging in direct armed warfare.

In today’s complex world, buffer states serve an important role by keeping warring factions at a safe distance from each other. Rival powers that cannot trust each other and live side by side are provided space to breathe by these buffer states. Buffer states provide strategic depth to the rival powers, allowing them to measure their opponent’s future moves without directly putting their own territories at stake.

16.3 Failed states

The “failed state” concept has been widely criticized because it super-aggregates various states and their problems. So, the main question is who shall judge whether a state is a failed one or not. Nonetheless, a distinction can be made according to state performance in delivering the most

crucial political goods. In that sense, a state is generally considered to have “failed” when it is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental duties of a modern nation-state, i.e., when it does not consistently and legitimately enforce its laws or does not provide its citizens with essential goods and services.

Common characteristics of failed states include disintegrated authority, lack of governmental legitimacy (when a significant portion of the state’s political elites and society reject the rules regulating power and the accumulation and distribution of wealth), insurgency, military interference in politics, ongoing civil violence, high crime rates, corruption, judicial incompetence, ineffective and impenetrable bureaucracy, poverty, illiteracy, and crumbling infrastructure.

Except for being labelled ‘failed’, such states are also named ‘fragile’. Fun fact: There is a “fragile states index” that measures the fragility level of 178 countries based on cohesion, economic, political, and social indicators.

16.4 Resilience

Resilience is the ability of a community or a country to cope, adapt and recover quickly from stress and shocks caused by violence, conflict and natural disasters without compromising longterm development.

The increasing frequency of natural disasters and humanitarian crises pose a major threat to longterm development and sustainable growth. Resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and territory.

They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Resilience is seen as an answer o fragility: helping build the capacity of states and societies to deal with increased risk and maintain of reestablish quickly their core functions after a shock.

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17. Weapons of mass destruction

17.1 Mutual nuclear deterrence

Mutual nuclear deterrence: a state of affairs in which two or more powers are prevented from a deliberate nuclear attack due to the potential irrevocable nuclear retaliation. Mutual nuclear deterrence results from a mutual threat with nuclear weapons and the potential cost that goes beyond fantasy and is not acceptable. Nuclear weapons are primarily psychological weapons as they threaten the opponent with total destruction.

It is based on the will of each side and on the declaration that it will use its nuclear weapons in the event of an attack. If this use were impossible for natural or moral reasons, then prevention would cease to work. It is essentially a state of belief on each side that the other has the will and the capacity to retaliate to a sufficient level. For mutual nuclear deterrence to work, the two sides don't need to have the same amount of heads or missiles since even a smaller number of these weapons can have devastating effects.

17.2 Weapons of mass destruction

Weapons of Mass Destruction are atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which might have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above. Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) constitute a class of weaponry with the potential to:

- 1) Produce in a single moment an enormous destructive effect capable to kill millions of civilians, jeopardize the natural environment, and fundamentally alter the lives of future generations through their catastrophic effects;
- 2) Cause death or serious injury of people through toxic or poisonous chemicals;
- 3) Disseminate disease-causing organisms or toxins to harm or kill humans, animals or plants;
- 4) Deliver nuclear explosive devices, chemical, biological or toxin agents to use them for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

17.3 Tactical nuclear weapons

There is no universally accepted definition for a "tactical," "nonstrategic," or "theater" nuclear weapons. There are many criteria which classify nuclear weapons as tactical, such as range, yield, target, national ownership, delivery vehicle, and capability. However, range is the most prominent one in order to make the distinction. In that context, 600 km are proposed as the maximum range for a tactical weapon by some.

Generally, tactical nuclear weapons refer to nuclear weapons designed to be used on a battlefield in military operations rather than against enemy cities or strategic nuclear forces. For the most part, tactical nuclear weapons have smaller explosive power than strategic ones. Nevertheless, their yields can be relatively low (0.1 kiloton), equal to those of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (15-20 kilotons), or very large (1 megaton).

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18. Peace-Support operation

18.1 Conflict prevention

Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement rarely occur in a linear or sequential way. Instead, they are mutually reinforcing and the boundaries between them have become increasingly blurred. Used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict that, thereby, reduces the risk of conflict recurring.

Conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intrastate or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the UN SecretaryGeneral's "good offices," preventive deployment or confidence-building measures.

18.2 Peace enforcement

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organization and agencies for enforcement action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter. It should not be confused with peacekeeping though. Peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.

18.3 Peacemaking

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The United Nations Secretary-General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his her own initiative, may exercise his or her "good offices" to facilitate the resolution of the conflict.

Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and nongovernmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently.

18.4 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.

There are three basic principles that continue to set UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security 1) Consent of the parties, 2) Impartiality, 3) Nonuse of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

18.5 Peacebuilding

The boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity.

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.

18.6 References

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19. US foreign policy

Introduction

The schools of US thought over foreign policy reflect deep-seated regional, economic, social, and class interests; they embody visions for domestic and foreign policy and express moral and political values and socio-economic and political interests.

19.1 Wilsonianism

Wilsonianism includes those who believe that the US has both a moral and a practical duty to spread its values throughout the world. It rests upon ideology and international law and is characterized by missionary zeal. Wilsonians support the spread of democracy abroad as a moral duty for the U.S (the shining city upon the hill) and as a practical imperative since they advocate that democracies do not fight each other, and therefore peace is safeguarded.

Moreover, they stand for the spread of free trade because, according to them, economic interdependence makes the cost of wars prohibitive. Lastly, they encourage collective security through multilateral organizations- mainly the U.N.

19.2 Hamiltonianism

Hamiltonianism sees the first task of the American government as promoting the health of American enterprise at home and abroad. It is characterized by its commercial orientation, its absence of illusions about the frailties of human nature, and its willingness to consider ideas like the balance of power and the use of force in international relations.

Hamiltonians do not oppose multilateral forms of cooperation, but they use them to serve American interests. One of these interests is the freedom of the seas. No sea and no strait should be closed to American ships. Hamiltonians draw from the European way of perceiving foreign policy, and thus, it does not resonate with the broader public.

19.3 Jacksonianism

Jacksonianism represents a deeply embedded, widely spread populist and popular culture of honor, independence, courage, and military pride among the American people. It combines individualism, democratic values, the will for self-reliance, and national honor with populism. Traditional Jacksonianism used to stand for an isolationist foreign policy.

Now, however, Jacksonians go against the U.S involvement in multilateral structures that aim to the "good of mankind." Moreover, Jacksonians stand for unilateral and decisive actions to secure national interests. Jacksonianism is more firmly entrenched in the heartland.

19.4 Jeffersonianism

Jeffersonianism sees the preservation of American democracy in a dangerous world as the most pressing and vital interest of the American people. It expresses American individualism and voices concerns over the preservation of the American Revolution acquis. Jeffersonians are afraid of the potential that the federal government abuses its power. Therefore, they would even like to see the constitutional restrictions on executive power tightened.

They also try to ensure foreign policy's constitutional conduct, arguing that excessive involvement overseas can compromise their democratic standards at home. Usually, Jeffersonianism does not influence the government's policy.

19.5 References

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